Lee v. Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners\u27 Association, Inc. Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 45390 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-6-2018 
Lee v. Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision 
Homeowners' Association, Inc. Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45390 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Lee v. Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Inc. Appellant's Brief 
Dckt. 45390" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 7213. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7213 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




WILLOW CREEK RANCH ESTATES 
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS’ 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and DOES I –X, inclusive, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
Supreme Court Dkt. No. 45390-2017 
 
Appeal from Canyon County 
Case No. CV-16-3425 
___________________________ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
___________________________ 
 
APEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
 
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. NYE, DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Daniel W. Bower, ISB #7204    Chris T. Troupis 
MORRIS BOWER & HAWS PLLC   TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100   801 E. State Street, Ste. 50 
Boise, Idaho 83713     P.O. Box 2408 
Telephone:  (208) 345-3333    Eagle, ID  83616 
Fax No.:  (208) 345-4461    Tel.:  (208) 938-5584 / Fax:  (208) 938-5482 
dbower@morrisbowerhaws.com   ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
       Matthew C. Parks 
       ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
       251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
       P.O. Box 1539    
       Boise, ID 83701 
       Tel.:  (208) 343-5454 / Fax:  (208) 384-5844 
       mcp@elamburke.com    
       Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ...............................2 
 




I. The District Court Failed To Appreciate Facts In The Record And Evidence, 
Including Performance, That Establish The Terms Of Agreement Without 
Ambiguity ............................................................................................................................9 
 
A. Introduction ..............................................................................................................9 
 
B. Standard Of Review ...............................................................................................11 
 
C. The Easement Agreement Between The Kemps And Lees Is Not So 
Indefinite, Incomplete And Uncertain That It Is Not Capable To Be 
Reduced To Writing As Evidence By The Fact That The Agreement Has 
Been Performed .....................................................................................................12 
 
D. The District Court Failed To Appreciate Facts In The Record, Including 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................23 
 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) .................................................. 12 
Barton v. Dunlap, 8 Idaho 82, 92, 66 P. 832, 836 (1901) ............................................................. 10 
Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994) .............. 9 
Birdwood Subdivision Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Bulotti Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 23, 175 
P.3d 179, 185 (2007) ................................................................................................................. 17 
Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 556, 381 P.2d 803, 804 (1963) ................................................ 10 
Boesiger, 85 Idaho at 557, 381 P.2d at 805 .................................................................................. 10 
Boesiger, 85 Idaho at 558, 381 P.2d at 805 .................................................................................. 10 
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004) ............................... 11 
Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 729 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1986) ............................................... 16 
Hoffman v. SV Co., 102 Idaho 187, 628 P.2d 218 (1981) ............................................................. 16 
Hoffman v. SV Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981)....................................... 9 
Idaho Power Co. v. State, By & Through Dep’t of Water Res., 104 Idaho 575, 587, 661 P.2d 741, 
753 (1983) ................................................................................................................................. 18 
Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 
(2001) ........................................................................................................................................ 11 
Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 137 Idaho 844, 846, 55 P.3d 298, 300 (2002) .......................... 12 
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990) ............................ 12 
Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 685, 183 P.3d 771, 773 (2008) .............................................. 11 
Partout, 145 Idaho at 688, 183 P.3d at 776 .................................................................................. 12 
Roundy, 98 Idaho at 629, 570 P.2d at 866 .................................................................................... 10 
Simmons v. Simmons, 134 Idaho 824, 826, 11 P.3d 20, 22 (2000) ................................... 13, 14, 15 
Streets [v. JM Land & Developing Co.], 898 P.2d [377] at 379–81 (Wyo.1995) ........................ 18 
Taylor v. Soran Restaurant, Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 960 P.2d 1254 (1998) ..................................... 18 
Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971) ................................................................ 16 
iii 
West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 84, 106 P.3d 401, 410 (2005) .................. 19 
West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho 75, 83, 106 P.3d 401, 409 (2005) ................................ 20 
West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 85, 106 P.3d at 411 (2005) ........................... 18, 19, 20 
Statutes 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) ................................................................................................................................ 11 
I.R.C.P. 56(e) ................................................................................................................................ 12 
Idaho Code § 9–503 ........................................................................................................................ 9 
Idaho Code § 9–504 ........................................................................................................................ 9 
Idaho Code § 9–505(4) ................................................................................................................... 9 
Other Authorities 
2017 Memorandum Decision and Order on Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment and HOA’s 
Motion to Amend .................................................................................. 1, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 18, 21 
Agreement for Sale of Real Property ...................................... 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 20 
August 4, 2016 Affidavit of Matthew C. Parks in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment ................................................................................. 4 
Complaint ........................................................................................................................................ 6 
Declaration of Alan Mills ........................................................................................................... 2, 5 
Declaration of Dale Lee .......................................................................................................... 2, 3, 4 
Horn Aff. ......................................................................................................................................... 4 
July 21, 2017 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Partial Summary 
Judgment on Issue of Partial Performance.................................................................................. 7 
May 18, 2017 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment .......................................................... 7 
May 18, 2017 Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment ...... 7, 21 
Warranty Deed ................................................................................................................................ 4 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dale and Kathi Lee (“Appellants” or the “Lees”), appeal the district court’s August 31, 
2017 Memorandum Decision and Order on Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment and HOA’s 
Motion to Amend (“Memorandum Decision”) wherein the district court granted Willow Creek 
Ranch Estates No.2 Subdivision Homeowners’ Association, Inc.’s (“Willow Creek HOA” or 
“HOA”) motion for summary judgment and denied the Lees’ motion for summary judgment. See 
Memorandum Decision, p.9 (R., p. 239).  Simply stated, the Lees assert the district court erred 
by concluding that the doctrine of “partial performance” was not applicable to the present 
circumstances even though all the material terms of an easement agreement were fully performed 
and evidence in the record could have been utilized to resolve any potential material ambiguity.  
The Lees also claim that, to the extent that this Court determines that the doctrine of partial 
performance is not applicable, this Court should extend the doctrine of equitable servitude to 
cover present circumstance.  As set forth below, the equities clearly favor the Lees.  It is 
uncontroverted fact that that there was an agreement to provide the Lees access to their property 
from Kemp Road and to construct three access points.  Moreover, there is no “real life” 
ambiguity regarding the agreement as the agreement was substantially performed.  It is 
undisputed that the Lees were provided access and are presently accessing their property from 
Kemp Road using the three access points constructed by the parties to the agreement.  And, it is 
also clear from the record that relevant parties had knowledge of the agreement and of the Lees’ 
use of the access points.  Here, however, the district court never got to a point to apply these 
equities because it concluded as a matter of law that those equitable theories are precluded under 
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Idaho law.  The Lees respectfully disagree with this legal assessment and submit that the district 
court erred in that determination.      
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In the summer of 1997, Dale Lee was approached by the Kemps regarding a possible real 
estate transaction.  See June 17, 2016 Declaration of Dale Lee (“Lee Decl.”), ¶2 (R., p. 39).  The 
Kemps and the Lees both owned real property north of Purple Sage Road in Middleton, Idaho.  
See Lee Decl., Ex. A (Exhibit A is a map of the property reflecting ownership of the land in 
1997) (R., p. 43).  To develop the “Kemp property” the Kemps needed approximately 1.8 acres 
of real property owned by the Lees.  The Lees agreed to sell them the 1.8 acres needed, but 
required as a condition of that sale, that they be given access to the road constructed by the 
Kemps on the Kemps property. See Lee Decl., ¶4 (R., p.39).  As explained by Dale Lee in his 
declaration: “My wife and I were willing to sell them [the Kemps] the 1.8 acres needed, but as a 
condition of that sale, wanted to ensure that we would have access to the road [] that was to be 
constructed by the Kemps.” Id.  Accordingly, Mr. Lee testified that the Kemps and the Lees 
agreed that “[a]ccess to Kemp Road, [would be] given as a condition to the sale of the 1.8 acre 
parcel.”  The real estate agent involved in the transaction was Alan Mills.  See Lee Decl., ¶5 (R., 
p.39); see also June 14, 2015 Declaration of Alan Mills (“Mills Decl.”), Exhibit A. (R., p.37).   
The road referenced above, presently known as Kemp Road, runs along the south border of the 
Kemp property (“Kemp Road”).  See Lee Decl., ¶6 (R., p. 6).   
On June 1, 1997, the Lees and the Kemps executed an Agreement for Sale of Real 
Property (“1997 Agreement” or “Agreement”). See Lee Decl., Exhibit B (R., p.44). The 1997 
3 
Agreement referenced the fact that the Lees had agreed to sell to the Kemps the 1.8 acres of real 
property needed by the Kemps to develop their property into the present day subdivision and 
home owner’s association and that in exchange the Lees would be given access to Kemp Road.  
Id. The 1997 Agreement also explained that the Kemps and the Lees were planning future 
development of their adjoining properties--both the Kemp property and the Lee property.  Id.  
And, recognizing future development by the Lees, the 1997 Agreement expressly stated that the 
Lees would be given three access points to the road: 
Seller [Lees] shall also be entitled to 3 driveway access from the 
gravel road [Kemp Road] to be constructed by Buyer [Kemps] 
adjoining Seller’s [Lees’] property.  Such access shall be 
constructed at Seller’s [Lees’] cost and subject to Seller [Lees] 
obtaining any necessary governmental approvals.  
Id.  Accordingly, the Lees sold the Kemps the property and the Kemps began developing the 
subdivision that is now Willow Creek Ranch Estates #2.  See Lee Decl., ¶12 (R., p. 40).   
In 2000, as part of the development, Kemp Road was constructed. The road was 
asphalted and, consistent with and in performance of the agreements and expectations of the 
Kemps and the Lees, three driveway access points were constructed giving the Lees’ property 
adjacent to Kemp Road three access points to Kemp Road as agreed.  See Lee Decl., ¶13 (R., p. 
40).  To be clear, this construction included the creation of the three access points referenced in 
the 1997 Agreement and included substantial improvement including twenty-four foot culverts 
and gravel extending from Kemp Road to the Lees’ property.  Around that same time, wood 
fencing and metal gates that corresponded to the three access points were also constructed by the 
Lees along the road—again, giving the Lees’ property clear and obvious access to Kemp Road.  
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See Lee Decl., ¶14 (R., p. 40, 226-230), Ex. C (R., p. 45); see also Horn Aff., ¶8 (R., p. 178).  
The construction of the road and access points constituted performance of the agreement 
between the Lees and the Kemps that the Lees would be given the access.  Indeed, the only 
aspect of the agreement that had arguably not been performed was that the Lees had not yet 
sought “necessary governmental approvals” to use the road.     
Significantly, one of the access points was constructed adjacent to a lot purchased by Mr. 
Horn.  See Horn Aff., ¶6 (R., p. 176).  According to Mr. Horn, a member of the HOA, because of 
the access points and the gates, it was obvious to him and to the other HOA members living in 
the subdivision, that the Lees accessed their property through Kemp Road.  See Horn Aff., ¶7 
(R., p. 176) (“It was obvious to me and anyone living in the subdivision, that the Lees accessed 
their property from Kemp Road.”).    
In 2005, as part of the continued development of the Willow Creek Ranch Estates, the 
Kemps transferred Kemp Road to the HOA as a common area owned by the HOA.  See Lee 
Decl., Ex. D (LEE0010) (R., p. 50) (“The Trust was the developer of Willow Creek Ranch 
Estates.  The Kemps transferred Kemp Lane to the HOA as part of the common area owned by 
the Association.”).  Of note, the “Warranty Deed” provided to the HOA from the Kemps, did not 
convey Kemp Road free from all encumbrances, but rather excluded from the conveyance “all 
existing easements and rights-of-ways of record or implied.”  See August 4, 2016 Affidavit of 
Matthew C. Parks in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment (“Aug. 4, 2016 Parks Aff.”), Ex. D (R., p. 101).  Again, this conveyance was after 
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Kemp Road and the access points had been constructed and after the Lees had been provided 
access and were using Kemp Road as witnessed by HOA member Mr. Horn. 
To be clear, there is substantial evidence that the HOA—when it received Kemp Road 
from the HOA—had knowledge of the Lees’ use and access of Kemp Road.  From its inception 
until 2005, the HOA and the board of directors for the HOA had been primarily controlled by the 
Kemps.  See Mills Decl., Ex. A (R., p. 37).  Mary Kemp, trustee of the Kemps, and Alan Mills, 
the Kemps’ real estate agent, served as the initial board members for the HOA.  Mr. Mills served 
as president.  Id.  Alan Mills has admitted that he had knowledge of the Kemps’ agreement to 
provide access points along Kemp Road to the Lees.  Id.  Mr. Mills testified as follows: 
During the development of the Willow Creek Subdivision, I served 
as one of the initial board of directors for the Willow Creek Ranch 
Estates No. 2, Subdivision Homeowner’s Association Inc. (the 
“HOA”) along with Mary Kemp, the trustee for the Kemp Family 
Trust.  As the developer of the Subdivision and who also 
controlled the HOA, the Kemp Family Trust paid to have the three 
driveway access constructed just as the parties agreed to do in the 
Agreement For Sale of Property. As a former HOA board member, 
I can say with a high degree of certainty that the HOA at the time 
was aware of the Agreement and its terms regarding the three 
driveway access. 
See Mills Decl., Ex. A (R., p. 37) (emphasis added). 
Thus, at the time that Kemp Road was transferred to the Willow Creek HOA in 2005, the 
evidence in the record clearly establishes that the Willow Creek HOA Board of Directors had 
actual knowledge of an easement agreement, including the Kemps’ agreement to provide the 
Lees the three access points, that the easement agreement was performed, and that the Lees were 
accessing Kemp Road.  Furthermore, due to the construction of the three access points, including 
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culvert construction, gravel work, fencing and gates (i.e., the performance of the easement 
agreement), the HOA and its members had constructive notice of an easement agreement that 
allowed the Lees to use Kemp Road to access their property through those three access points. 
Accordingly, it came as a significant surprise when the HOA objected to the Lees’ 
attempts to proceed with the county (i.e., governmental approval) to develop the property and to 
create driveways for homes utilizing the access points--access points that had already been 
constructed.  Accordingly, on April 11, 2016, the Lees initiated legal action to prevent the HOA 
from blocking their work with the county.  That legal action, the underlying action, was a 
declaratory action requesting a determination from the district court that “Kemp Road, is 
encumbered by equitable servitudes, conditions and restrictions allowing for access by the 
Lees…” See Complaint, p.6 (R., p. 16).   
Significantly, because it was undisputed that the 1997 Agreement, by itself, was not an 
enforceable easement agreement, the existence of an enforceable encumbrance centered on two 
legal theories:  1) partial performance of an easement agreement memorialized at least in part by 
the 1997 Agreement and 2) equitable servitude—that the equities created an encumbrance that 
prevented the HOA from preventing the Lees from using Kemp Road.  First, the Lees asserted 
that the agreement between the Kemps and the Lees--that the Lees would be given access to 
Kemp Road--had been partially performed and became an enforceable agreement regardless of 
the statute of frauds issues identified by the HOA.  Second, the Lees claimed the existence of an 
equitable servitude because it was uncontroverted fact that the HOA Board and membership had 
knowledge of the Kemps’ agreement to provide the Lees with access to Kemp Road and that it 
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was not equitable or fair to preclude the HOA from presently precluding the Lees from accessing 
Kemp Road. 
   The HOA disagreed and, ultimately, in the spring and summer of 2017, both parties 
moved for summary judgment.  See May 18, 2017 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R., p. 115) and July 21, 2017 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Partial 
Summary Judgment on Issue of Partial Performance (R., p. 157).  As a basis for summary 
judgment, the HOA argued that Idaho’s Statute of Limitations precluded the Lees from arguing 
that an easement agreement existed or was enforceable.  The HOA argued the Statute of 
Limitations precluded evidence of the agreement because: “The 1997 Agreement does not 
contain a valid legal description of the purported easement…[and that] [t]he 1997 Agreement is 
not notarized and the record contains no evidence that can establish the Kemp Family Trust 
executed the 1997 Agreement.” See May 18, 2017 Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p.2 (R., p. 118).  The HOA also asserted that Lees were not 
entitled to an “equitable servitude because the elements of establishing an equitable servitude 
cannot be established.” Id. at p.3 (R., p. 119). 
On August 31, 2017, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment and HOA’s Motion to Amend (“August 31, 2017 
Memorandum Decision” or “Memorandum Decision”) (R., p. 231).  In that Memorandum 
Decision, the district court addressed both the “equitable servitude” and “partial performance” 
arguments.  The district court appreciated the Lees’ arguments and found a factual dispute as to 
whether the HOA had knowledge of an underlying easement agreement.  The district court did 
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find, however, that Kemp Road had in fact been constructed, that the access points from Kemp 
Road to the Lees’ property had also been constructed, including “culverts and gravel extending 
Kemp Road to the Lee’s property,” and that “fencing and metal gates corresponding to the access 
points corresponding to the 3 access points were constructed along the property.” See 
Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3 (R., pp. 232-33).  Notwithstanding these factual findings and the 
factual dispute over the HOA’s prior knowledge of the agreement, the district court concluded 
that summary judgment, as a matter of law, should be entered in the HOA’s favor.   
The HOA rejected the Lees argument that they were entitled to an easement.  First, with 
regard to the “equitable servitude” argument, the district court concluded that there could be no 
equitable relief under this theory because it concluded that “equitable servitudes do not confer an 
affirmative right to enter and use another’s land” and that here, the Lees were asking for an 
“affirmative right to use or access land [Kemp Road].” See Memorandum Decision, pp.5-6 (R., 
pp. 235-36).  Second, with regard to the Lees’ “partial performance” argument, the district court 
simply concluded that the “97 Agreement is too indefinite, incomplete, and uncertain in all of its 
material terms…to allow enforcement by operation of the doctrine of part performance.”  See 
Memorandum Decision, p.8 (R., p. 238).  Accordingly, the district court concluded that summary 
judgment should be granted in the HOA’s favor as a matter of law.  Id.   





ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
Did the district court err in concluding that the doctrine of partial performance did not 
apply to the agreement between the Lees and Kemps regarding access to Kemp Road? 
 
Should this Court apply the doctrine of equitable servitude to the present circumstances 
regardless of how the right to use Kemp Road is classified? 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Failed To Appreciate Facts In The Record And Evidence, Including 
Performance, That Establish The Terms Of Agreement Without Ambiguity 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, an agreement regarding an interest in real property, in this case an easement 
agreement, is invalid unless that agreement is “in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or 
by his agent.” See Idaho Code § 9–505(4); see also Idaho Code § 9–503; Hoffman v. SV Co., 
Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981).  Here, there is no dispute.  The written 
agreement, the 1997 Agreement, does not satisfy Idaho’s statute of frauds. 
However, Idaho law also makes clear that the statute of frauds shall not be construed “to 
abridge the power of any court to compel the specific performance of an agreement, in case of 
part performance thereof.” Idaho Code § 9–504.  The doctrine of part performance provides that 
when the parties to an agreement fail to reduce the agreement to writing, or otherwise fail to 
satisfy the statute of frauds, the agreement “may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the 
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purchaser has partly performed the agreement.” See Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 
Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994).  In this case, the district court erred when it concluded 
that it could not apply the doctrine of partial performance simply because a term was not clear, 
i.e., the 1997 Agreement did not include a property description.  Here, the terms of the easement 
agreement, an agreement that was essentially already performed, was clear, not just by the 1997 
Agreement, but by the actions of the parties and other parole evidence. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that “what constitutes part performance must depend 
upon the particular facts of each case and the sufficiency of particular acts is a matter of law.”  
See Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 556, 381 P.2d 803, 804 (1963).  “The most important acts 
which constitute a sufficient part performance are actual possession, permanent and valuable 
improvements and these two combined.” Roundy, 98 Idaho at 629, 570 P.2d at 866 (quoting 
Barton v. Dunlap, 8 Idaho 82, 92, 66 P. 832, 836 (1901)).  The acts constituting part performance 
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, Boesiger, 85 Idaho at 558, 381 P.2d at 805, 
and they must also be definitely referable to the alleged oral contract, Boesiger, 85 Idaho at 557, 
381 P.2d at 805; Roundy, 98 Idaho at 629, 570 P.2d at 866.  A review of the record shows 
conclusive evidence of actual possession and improvement.  Indeed, there is no real dispute 
regarding the acts that constitute performance of the agreement.  It is incontrovertible fact that 
Kemp Road was constructed, access points were created and that the Lees accessed their 
property through Kemp Road.  See Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3 (R., pp. 232-33).  
Regardless, the district court concluded that the 1997 Agreement “does not contain provisions 
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that are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty, to allow enforcement by the 
operation of the doctrine of part performance.”)  Id. at p.8 (R., p. 238). 
Thus, as to the “partial performance” argument, it appears that error turns on whether 
“the underlying contract can be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”  The Lees submit that 
the underlying agreement can be so proven and that the district court’s determination that it 
cannot is wrong.  Moreover, to the extent that the 1997 Agreement is determined to be 
ambiguous as to its terms (i.e., lacks a property description), that ambiguity can be cured by 
parole evidence or at the very least creates a genuine issue of material fact that should have 
precluded summary judgment.  Stated differently, to the extent that parole evidence in the record 
regarding the ambiguity is not conclusive, the Lees should have been permitted to cure that 
ambiguity by presenting that evidence to a trier of fact to resolve that ambiguity--something the 
Idaho Supreme Court has sanctioned in similar circumstances.    
B. Standard Of Review 
 In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court’s standard of 
review is the same as the standard used by the district court in passing upon a motion for 
summary judgment.  See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 685, 183 P.3d 771, 773 (2008). “All 
disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” 
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004).  Summary judgment 
is proper if the “pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
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any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
The “fact that both parties move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana 
Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001).  The moving party bears the burden of 
proving the absence of material facts but “is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Partout, 145 Idaho at 688, 183 P.3d at 
776 (quoting Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)).  In a case that 
would otherwise be decided by a jury, the trial court is not free to arrive at the most probable 
inferences that may be drawn, but is compelled to draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party.  Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 137 Idaho 844, 846, 55 P.3d 298, 300 (2002).  The non-
moving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party’s pleadings, but 
that party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” I.R.C.P. 56(e).  Summary judgment must be 
denied “if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions.” Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 
720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990). 
C. The Easement Agreement Between The Kemps And Lees Is Not So Indefinite, 
Incomplete ,And Uncertain That It Is Not Capable To Be Reduced To Writing As 
Evidenced By The Fact That The Agreement Has Been Performed 
13 
The district court over-simplistically concluded that the “easement provision in the 97 
Agreement is too indefinite, incomplete, and uncertain in all of its material terms, and does not 
contain provisions that are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty to allow 
enforcement by operation of the doctrine of part performance.”  See Memorandum Order, p.9.  
The district court erred in this determination by looking only at the 1997 Agreement and ignoring 
facts in the record that made it possible to specifically enforce an easement agreement that had 
already been substantially performed and whose terms are not ambiguous or undisputed.  Here, it 
appears from the district court’s Memorandum Decision and the HOA’s arguments that the 
asserted ambiguity was the admitted fact that the 1997 Agreement did not contain a property 
description.  However, a lack of a proper property description in an agreement nearly fully 
performed does not preclude the application of the doctrine of partial performance. 
An illustrative example of the district court’s misstep is Simmons v. Simmons, 134 Idaho 
824, 826, 11 P.3d 20, 22 (2000).  In Simmons, two brothers and their wives were joint owners of 
farmland.  One of the brothers and his wife, Newell and Carol Simmons, also owned a house and 
approximately sixty acres. Id.  The other brother and his wife, Joel and DeLila Simmons, also 
owned a home and land. Id.  All of the property, the farmland and the two homes and additional 
acreage, were subject to a Federal Land Bank mortgage and at some point the obligation to the 
Federal Land Bank was in default. Id. The two couples met to discuss possible alternatives in 
lieu of foreclosure on the farm property and it was determined that Joel and DeLila would file for 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy to save the property. Id. To avoid participation in the bankruptcy 
proceedings, Newell and Carol Simons quitclaimed their interest in the farmland to DeLila and 
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Joel Simmons as well as their interest in their house and the sixty acres.  The parties agreed that 
after the Federal Land Bank Debt was satisfied that Joel and Delila Simmons would then convey 
the home and sixty acres back to Newell and Carol Simmons.  Id.  A memorandum was prepared 
but had obvious deficiencies including not having all proper signatures and inadequate property 
descriptions.  Years later, after the debt was satisfied, DeLila Simmons (her husband Joel had 
since passed away) refused to convey the house and sixty acres back to Newell and Carol and 
litigation ensued. Id. 
The primary issue in Simmons was whether enforcement of the agreement was barred by 
the “Statute of Frauds” on the basis that the “writing was not signed by all the parties, that it does 
not contain a proper description of the property to ascertain the exact identity of the land in 
question, and that the oral conditions have been left out of the agreement.”  Simmons, 134 Idaho 
at 827, 11 P.3d at 23.  The trial court applied the doctrine of part performance and also applied 
parole evidence to clear up ambiguities in the flawed memorandum and to avoid the application 
of the Idaho’s Statute of Frauds.  Stated differently and to highlight the district court’s error in 
this case, the trial court did not look exclusively at the terms of the imperfect and flawed written 
agreement that did not include an adequate property description, but considered whether parole 
evidence could clear up ambiguities that could enable it to apply to the doctrine of partial 
performance.   
Significantly, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court and appreciated the 
fact that there had been full performance of the agreement by Newell and Carol Simmons: 
“Newell and Carol fully performed their part of the agreement which resulted in DeLila 
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[Simmons] saving the entire farm property from foreclose” and that “[a]ll that remains is for 
[DeLila Simmons] to perform her part of the bargain.” Id. As for the “lacking essential terms” 
the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s application of parole evidence to address 
the ambiguity:  “Parole evidence is necessary to properly construe the intent of the parties in this 
case and to properly identify the property to be conveyed…”  Simmons, 134 Idaho at 828, 11 
P.3d at 24 (emphasis added).  Like in Simmons, there is ample parole evidence in the record to 
construe the intent of the parties—cure the lack of an insufficient property description in the 
underlying agreement.   
Indeed, the circumstances in this case are even stronger in favor of the Lees.  In the 
present case we had an initial oral agreement between the Lees and Kemps, a portion of which 
was reduced to writing—the 1997 Agreement.  Admittedly, in this case, as with the 
memorandum in Simmons, the 1997 Agreement contained an incomplete description of the 
property at issue, Kemp Road.  However, in this case and in Simmons, it is clear that there has 
been performance of an agreement by the parties and there is parole evidence that can be applied 
definitively to resolve any ambiguity that exists as to the essential terms of the easement 
agreement (i.e., lack of a property description). Again, here, the agreement has been near fully 
performed, Kemp Road was constructed and the access points created—we know the property 
description because Kemp Road was constructed along with the access points.  Accordingly, it is 
a fiction to assert an ambiguity as to what property is subject to the easement.     
Also, the equitable argument for partial performance is even stronger than in Simmons 
because the agreement in light of both “possession” and “improvement”--the most important 
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factors in partial performance.  The road and access points were constructed and access to the 
road was clearly provided to the Lees.  The only aspect of the easement agreement that was not 
performed was that the Lees had not received full “government approval” for use of Kemp 
Road—a provision spelled out in the written document and that needs no clarification.  Thus, 
performance here was even stronger than it was in Simmons.  And, again, to be clear, all other 
obligations had been performed.  Thus, given the substantial performance of the obligations, the 
doctrine of partial performance as a form of equitable estoppel, is even more applicable and an 
even stronger basis for application in this case. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated, “[t]he doctrine of partial performance is best 
understood as a specific form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel.” Frantz v. 
Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 729 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1986).  The Idaho appellate court went on to 
state as follows: 
The Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly has held that when one party has fully 
performed an oral contract within the statute of frauds, he is not entitled to collect 
damages for a breach. Rather, he is entitled to the equitable remedy of specific 
performance. 
 
Id. at 1009.  The court in Frantz also stated, 
... the object of the statute is to prevent potential fraud by forbidding disputed 
assertions of enumerated kinds of contracts without any written basis. This 
purpose is fully satisfied when the parties themselves accept the contract and 
mutually perform it.  For the same reason, the statute of frauds is inapplicable 
when a contract, although not fully performed by both sides, is mutually 
acknowledged to exist.  
 
Id. at 1008-1009. The object of the statute, preventing potential fraud, is not an issue in this case.  
Consequently, here, consistent with these articulated principles, there is no potential fraud. The 
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performance and actions of the parties confirm the agreement and informed the world of the 
terms of that agreement--including the property at issue, Kemp Road. 
Moreover, as mentioned previously, Idaho has long acknowledged the importance of the 
doctrine of partial performance as an equitable remedy.  This is especially true when the remedy 
sought is specific performance—as it is here.  See Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 
(1971).  See also Hoffman v. SV Co., 102 Idaho 187, 628 P.2d 218 (1981).  In summation, it is 
simply unjust and inequitable for the statute of frauds to even be an issue here given the 
performance by the parties.  It is incontrovertible fact that the Lees performed their obligations. 
They sold their land on the condition that they would be provided access to Kemp Road.  And, 
indeed, the Lees have relied on the terms of the agreement and the fact that the agreement was 
essentially performed.  It is patently unfair and contrary the purpose behind Idaho’s statute of 
frauds to allow the HOA to assert the statute of frauds as a technical basis for disregarding the 
agreement between the Kemps and the Lees--to essentially to go back on an agreement that has 
already been substantially performed and to treat it as if it never existed.  This case is a blue print 
for equitable estoppel as applied through the doctrine of partial performance and the reasons why 
it is an important equitable doctrine that protects Idahoans that perform their agreements. 
D. The District Court Failed To Appreciate Facts In The Record, Including 
Performance, That Establish The Terms Of Agreement 
 This case also presents this Court with the opportunity to extend and clarify Idaho’s 
interpretation on an important legal doctrine—equitable servitude.  In the event the Court 
concludes it cannot apply equitable relief in the context of equitable estoppel and partial 
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performance, this Court should extend the doctrine of equitable servitude to the present 
circumstances.   
 Here, the Lees assert that they have an equitable interest in real property—access to 
Kemp Road.  Significantly, that interest arises “by implication from the language of the deeds or 
the conduct of the parties.”  See Birdwood Subdivision Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Bulotti 
Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 23, 175 P.3d 179, 185 (2007) (quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, 
Etc., § 155 (2005) (an equitable servitude arises “by implication from the language of the deeds 
or the conduct of the parties.”)); see also Idaho Power Co. v. State, By & Through Dep’t of 
Water Res., 104 Idaho 575, 587, 661 P.2d 741, 753 (1983) (“restrictive covenants and equitable 
servitudes” relate to “[a]greements not to assert ownership rights.”).   
 The district court declined to extend the doctrine of equitable servitude and ruled as a 
matter of law that the equities, here the conduct of the parties and performance of the agreement, 
could not be the basis for conferring an “affirmative right to use land.”  See Memorandum 
Decision, p.6 (R., p.236).  Instead, the district court focused exclusively on the nature of the 
property right—whether an “equitable servitude confers an affirmative right to use or access 
land.” Id.  As set forth below, this is inconsistent with the direction and purpose of prior rulings 
from this Court that have focused on the equities as opposed to the classification of the servitude 
asserted:   
Whether a successor in interest takes the interest subject to the equitable servitude 
is a question of notice. Streets [v. JM Land & Developing Co.], 898 P.2d [377] at 
379–81 (Wyo.1995). Whether a party has notice of an issue or event is a question 
of fact. See, e.g., Taylor v. Soran Restaurant, Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 960 P.2d 1254 
(1998) (Whether notice of injury subject to workers' compensation claim was 
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given to employer was question of fact.)  The difficulty presented by this inquiry 
is that the district court did not ground its judgment in the question of notice. The 
district court stated, “West Wood cannot improve its position over that of APP.” 
This conclusion is in error because the relevant inquiry is not into what right or 
interest APP had to give. 
 
West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 85, 106 P.3d at 411 (emphasis added).  Significantly, 
in West Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the other land owners had an 
“affirmative right” to use Lot 5.  Indeed, the title for Section B states emphatically that: “The 
District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Found That Respondents [Lot Owners and 
the HOA] Had Equitable Servitudes Affording Them Exclusive Rights and Use of Lot 5.”  Id. at 
83, 106 P.3d at 409 (extra emphasis added).  See also Section B, Subsection 1: “The owners and 
association have an equitable interest enforceable against the original promisor.”  Id. at 84, 106 
P.3d at 4010.  Clearly, West Wood confirms that when looking at equitable relief in the context 
of a promise regarding real property, whether or not the right is affirmative or negative is not 
dispositive.  
It is important to note that Idaho’s approach to “equitable servitudes” or “equitable 
interests” is unique and has always been more equitable than in most states.  For example, Idaho 
permits an equitable servitude to be created “because of the actions of the parties, such as oral 
representations.”  West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 84, 106 P.3d 401, 410 
(2005).  In fact, Idaho is one of the few states that allows for the creation of equitable servitudes 
without a written agreement. Moreover, it certainly appears that Idaho has never restricted 
equitable servitude to particular encumbrances such as an “affirmative right to use land.”  And, a 
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review of the case law shows that Idaho courts have always focused on the equities of why a 
party should, in equity, have an interest in real property where circumstances so require. 
The West Wood case cited above is a prime example and illustrates Idaho’s unique 
approach to equitable interests.  It further indicates why Idaho should not deny equitable relief 
simply because the encumbrance relates to affirmative right as opposed to a negative right to use 
land--a distinction without a difference in the context of equitable relief.  In West Wood the 
plaintiffs were a group of owners and associations that asserted an equitable interest in certain 
real property--the claim, much like the claim here, was that they were entitled to use or have 
access to a common area.  See West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho 75, 83, 106 P.3d 401, 409 
(2005) (“the interest asserted by the Owners [that they had a right to use a common area] was an 
equitable interest…”).  It is significant that in West Wood the issue was whether the members of 
an HOA could enforce an agreement executed by the original land owner—that the lot at issue, 
Lot 5—would be subject to an easement that allowed use by the other lot owners for recreational 
purposes.  The district court ruled in favor of the HOA and lot owners and concluded, because of 
the equities, that they should have that affirmative right and that the subsequent owner of the lot 
could not prevent that use. Of paramount importance, this Court ruled that the “owners and 
associations have an equitable interest enforceable against West Wood, the subsequent purchaser 
of APP’s [the original owner’s] interest.” West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 85, 106 
P.3d at 411 (2005).  
In this case, the Lees and the Kemps agreed to develop their property and that the Kemps 
would construct a road that would be used by both parties—in essence, a common area.  The 
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conduct of the parties and a written document, the 1997 Agreement, support this fact.  This is 
significant because the primary argument asserted by the HOA at summary judgment and 
adopted by the district court is that the Lees’ equitable claims are precluded simply because the 
Lees assert an “affirmative right” to use property instead of a negative restrictive covenant:   
The Lees are not seeking to limit Willow Creek’s use of Kemp Road (which 
would be a restrictive covenant).  Rather, they are seeking a right of use over 
Kemp Road (which is an affirmative easement).  Because the Lees are not seeking 
a restrictive covenant, which may be created by conduct, but rather they are 
seeking an affirmative right to use the land of Willow Creek, in order to prevail at 
trial they must provide a written agreement complying with the statute of frauds.    
  
See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Memo, p. 8 (R., p. 124).  This argument is 
wrong and illustrates the HOA’s attempt to remove all equitable relief under the present 
scenario.  While it is certainly appreciated that other jurisdictions may draw a distinction, this 
Court has not adopted such a distinction and should not adopt one now.  Indeed, neither the 
Kemps nor the district court identified any Idaho case that precludes an Idaho court from 
recognizing the Lees’ equitable interest in the enforcement of an agreement regarding a right to 
use land, of which the HOA had actual and constructive notice—rather, they argue that no Idaho 
case allowed the district court to do so.  Here, for the reasons explained above, because of the 
“implications from the language and deeds [and] conduct of the parties” this Court should extend 
the principles of West Wood to the circumstances and find an equitable basis that affords the 
Lees the right to use Kemp Road to access their property.   
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Lees respectfully request this Court reverse the 
Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment in favor of the HOA and enter summary 
judgment in favor of the Lees, or in the alternative, remand the case back to the district court to 
resolve genuine issues of material fact that preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
Lees.  In the event that this Court reverses and/or remands, because the district court has also 
awarded costs, the Lees would respectfully request that the award of attorney fees and costs also 
be reversed and/or vacated.   
DATED this 6th day of March, 2018.   
MORRIS BOWER & HAWS PLLC 
 
Daniel W. Bower  
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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